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RUTGERS LAW REVIEW
Winter 1996

VOLUME 48

NUMBER 2

OUTCOME, PROCEDURE AND PROCESS:
AGENCY DUTIES OF EXPLANATION FOR LEGAL
CONCLUSIONS
Gary Lawson*
The so-called Chevron doctrine,' which requires reviewing
courts to accept all reasonable agency interpretations of statutes that the agency administers,2 is one of the most important doctrines in modern federal administrative law. Under the
now-familiar two-step formulation enunciated by the Chevron
court, if Congress "has directly spoken to the precise question
at issue ...

,

that is the end of the matter; for the court, as

well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously
expressed intent of Congress."3 If the statute is ambiguous,

* Class of 1940 Professor, Northwestern University School of Law. I

am grateful to Mark Seidenfeld for his comments.
1. The doctrine derives its name from Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). The name is
misleading, as the Chevron doctrine actually has very little to do with
the Chevron decision-but that is a story for another time.
2. Id. at 842-43. Agencies do not administer every statute that they
must interpret and apply. The word "administer" in this context is a
term of art that the courts have not yet defined with precision. See Gary
Lawson, Proving the Law, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 859, 884 n.78 (1992).
3. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
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however, the court must accept any permissible, or reasonable,4 interpretation put forth by the agency.5 Observers of
modern administrative law know that most of the action in
Chevron cases is focused on step one. If the reviewing court
finds the relevant statute ambiguous, the agency's interpretation is almost always upheld at step two, with little discussion
by the court.6
Professor Mark Seidenfeld has recently argued that, in
Chevron cases, reviewing courts should significantly expand
their presently perfunctory step-two analyses.' Under Professor Seidenfeld's proposal, courts at Chevron step two would not
merely ask whether the agency's interpretation of a statute
objectively bears some plausible relationship to the statute's
meaning, but would also require agencies to proffer reasoned
4. The Chevron decision unhelpfully spoke only of "permissible" agency interpretations, but subsequent decisions have clarified that "permissible" in this context means "reasonable." See, e.g., Pauley v. Bethenergy
Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 699 (1991).
5. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44. The Chevron test can be formulated
more simply as a one-step inquiry that asks whether the agency interpretation is reasonable. This one-step test would reach exactly the same results as the current two-step formulation, but with less room for misunderstanding, because an interpretation that is inconsistent with the clear
meaning of the relevant statute is ipso facto unreasonable. See Lawson,
supra note 2, at 884 n.78; Panel Discussion, Developments in Judicial
Review with Emphasis on the Concepts of Standing and Deference to the

Agency, 4 ADMIN. L.J. 113, 123-26 (1990) (comments of the Honorable
Stephen F. Williams).
6. See Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned Decisionmaking in Reviewing Agency Interpretations of Statutes, 73

TEX. L. REV. 83, 96 (1994) ("Regardless of whether a reviewing court is
deferential or active, once it reaches step two it rarely reverses an agency interpretation as unreasonable."). Agencies do occasionally lose at step
two, see, e.g., Whitecliff, Inc. v. Shalala, 20 F.3d 488, 493-94 (D.C. Cir.
1994); Abbott Lab. v. Young, 920 F.2d 984, 988 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Associated Gas Distribs. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 899 F.2d 1250,
1261 (D.C. Cir. 1990), but such decisions are relatively rare. Not all
judges are happy with this state of affairs. See, e.g., Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc. v. Reilly, 976 F.2d 36, 41-42 (D.C. Cir. 1992)
(Silberman, J., concurring) ("It is sometimes thought ...

that if the

statutory language is ambiguous, affirmance of the agency's interpretation
is a foregone conclusion. I believe that notion misreads the 'plain
language' of the Chevron opinion (if I may be pardoned the pun).").
7. See Seidenfeld, supra note 6.
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justifications for their chosen interpretations.8 In other words,
according to Professor Seidenfeld, courts should subject agency
interpretations of statutes to a review that is analogous to
"hard look" review, which has been a staple of judicial review
of federal agency policymaking for the past quarter-century.9
Professor Seidenfeld defends his proposal primarily on
grounds of political theory."0 Regardless of whether one finds
that defense persuasive (and I do not), there is a much more
mundane reason to take Professor Seidenfeld's proposal seriously: his proposal is already the law and has been the law, at
least in theory, for several decades. Well-settled principles of
administrative review plainly require agencies to provide reasoned explanations for their legal interpretations, in almost
precisely the fashion that Professor Seidenfeld desires."
Nonetheless, Professor Seidenfeld is correct that courts generally have not enforced, or even acknowledged, the requirement that agencies explain the bases for their legal conclusions. This gap between theory and practice results from the
failure of courts and scholars to consider carefully some very

8. As Professor Seidenfeld put it:
Thus, in reviewing an agency's interpretation, courts should require the agency to identify the concerns that the statute addresses and explain how the agency's interpretation took those
concerns into account. In addition, the agency should explain
why it emphasized certain interests instead of others. In other
words, the agency must reveal what led it to balance the statutory aims as it did. The agency should also respond to any likely
contentions that its interpretation will have deleterious implications. In short, to satisfy the second step of the syncopated Chevron, the agency should explain why its interpretation is good
policy in light of the purposes and concerns underlying the statutory scheme.
Id. at 129.
9. Id. at 128-29. For a short discussion of "hard look" review, see
infra text accompanying notes 40-43.
10. Professor Seidenfeld argues that Chevron deference is grounded in
a pluralistic political theory, Seidenfeld, supra note 6, at 94-103, that is
descriptively and normatively inferior to a political theory that emphasizes republican notions of deliberative democracy. Id. at 125-27. As Professor Seidenfeld straightforwardly put it, "[deliberative democratic theory
suggests a revamping of Chevron." Id. at 138.
11. See infra Part II.
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elementary aspects of scope-of-review doctrine. Participants in
and observers of the federal administrative scene have not adequately distinguished among judicial review of the outcome of
the agency proceeding, the procedures employed by the agency
in reaching that outcome, and the process of decisionmaking, or
chain of reasoning, by which the agency reached its conclusions. Accordingly, Part I of this article discusses this basic but
widely misunderstood distinction among outcome, procedure
and process in the context of contemporary law governing
scope of review of agency action. Part II draws on this discussion to demonstrate that current doctrine obliges courts to
require agencies to provide reasoned explanations for their
legal conclusions. Part III then discusses in detail a recent
opinion from the D.C. Circuit12 that reflects the court's recognition of this obligation. This decision may herald a long-overdue merger of theory and practice regarding judicial review of
agency legal conclusions.
I. OUTCOME, PROCEDURE AND PROCESS
A court reviewing an agency decision can evaluate at least
three aspects of the decision: the agency's decisionmaking
outcome, the agency's decisionmaking procedure, and the
agency's decisionmaking process. A defect in the outcome, the
procedure or the process can be an independently sufficient
ground to prevent affirmance of the agency decision.1"
A classic example of an outcome test is the "substantial
evidence" test used to review factual conclusions in formal
agency proceedings." Whatever may be the appropriate quan-

12. National Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs v. ICC, 41 F.3d 721
(D.C. Cir. 1994).
13. Such defects "prevent affirmance" rather than "require reversal,"
because errors in agency proceedings often call for a remand to the agency rather than an outright reversal.
14. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1994) ("The reviewing court shall.
hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions
found to be . . .unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to
sections 556 and 557 of this title or otherwise reviewed on the record of
an agency hearing provided by statute . . ...
"). Organic statutes can also
prescribe a "substantial evidence" test for factual conclusions in informal
proceedings. See, e.g., Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v.
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tum of evidence needed to satisfy the substantial evidence
test,15 application of the test does not require one to know
anything about the conclusion under review other than the
conclusion itself. A judge applying the substantial evidence test
need not know how or why the agency generated the conclusion; rather, the judge need only consider whether that conclusion satisfies a certain threshold of consistency with the record. 6 The conclusion either has the requisite "fit" with the
record evidence or it does not. The substantial evidence test
judges the outcome of the agency proceeding, not the methods
by which that outcome was generated.
Although the "how" and "why" of the agency's factual conclusions are irrelevant to the substantial evidence test, they are
not necessarily irrelevant to the judicial review process. Suppose that a judge determines, upon examination of an agency
factual conclusion and a specified record, that the conclusion
has the requisite "fit" with that record to satisfy the substantial evidence test (or any other applicable outcome test). Further suppose that the judge concludes that the agency, in the
course of reaching its conclusion, failed to provide a legally required public hearing. The agency decision will be reversed or

Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 745 F.2d 677, 682-83 (D.C.
Cir. 1984) (containing dictum that construes 12 U.S.C. § 1848 (1994) to
require substantial evidence review of the Board's factual conclusions in
informal rulemakings).
15. No single verbal formula expresses the quantum of evidence needed to satisfy the substantial evidence test. Based on the Supreme Court's
articulations of the standard, see Consolo v. Federal Maritime Comm'n,
383 U.S. 607 (1966); Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474
(1951), and the lower courts' day-to-day application of the standard, one
can fairly say that the standard is less deferential than the standard for
review of jury factfinding but more deferential than the "clearly erroneous" test for review of factfinding by federal judges in bench trials.
16. Under the Administrative Procedure Act an agency factual conclusion in a formal proceeding must be supported entirely by material in
the closed, historical record of the proceeding. 5 U.S.C. § 556(e) (1994)
("The transcript of testimony and exhibits, together with all papers and
requests filed in the proceeding, constitutes the exclusive record for decision . . . ."). A substantial evidence review under an organic statute may
allow a factual conclusion to be supported by evidence outside a closed
record, but the body of material to which the agency conclusion must
conform must somehow be defined.
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remanded, not because the outcome is unsupported by substantial evidence, but because the decision is procedurally
defective. Procedural error-the failure to jump through all of
the hoops prescribed by law-is a distinct form of error that is
independent of the substantive merits of the agency's outcome.
Outcome tests focus on what the agency concluded, while procedural tests focus on how the agency reached and issued its
conclusion. A substantively flawless outcome can fail a procedural test, and a procedurally flawless decision can fail an
outcome test.
Suppose now that an agency factual conclusion satisfies the
relevant outcome and procedural tests, but the agency reached
its conclusion by consulting astrological charts. While the
agency's outcome may correspond to the record evidence closely
enough to satisfy the substantial evidence or other applicable
outcome test, and the agency may have complied with every
legally required procedure, the reviewing court will still reject
the decision. The law independently requires that the agency's
decisionmaking process-the chain of reasoning employed by
the agency to reach its conclusion once all applicable procedures have been followed-satisfy a minimum standard of
rationality. Process tests, which perhaps should be called reasoning process or decisionmaking process tests to distinguish
them clearly from procedural tests, concern why the agency
reached the conclusion that it did.
The Administrative Procedure Act requires reviewing courts
to reject agency decisions that are, inter alia, "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with law."17 In some contexts, this provision serves as an outcome test; it requires, for example, that an adequate quantum
of evidence support factual conclusions in informal proceedings," to which the substantial evidence test generally does
not apply. It can also serve as a source of procedural requirements if an agency's failure to afford to a party procedures that
are permitted, but not otherwise required, by law would be
"arbitrary," "capricious" or "an abuse of discretion." 9 Finally,
17. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1994).
18. See Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc., 745 F.2d at
683 (stating that "the substantial evidence test and the arbitrary and
capricious test are one and the same").
19. Theoretically, a procedure that is not otherwise legally required
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the "arbitrary or capricious" test regulates an agency's
decisionmakingprocess by ensuring that the agency reaches its
conclusions through a rational decisionmaking mechanism.2
Astrological divination is not a rational decisionmaking process, and inferences from planetary or stellar positions generally are not rational reasons for adopting a conclusion. 2 ' Even if
the agency's astrological speculations coincidentally yield an
outcome that passes the relevant outcome test, the agency
decision cannot stand because the agency is obliged to reach its
conclusions through a rational reasoning process.
At a minimum, the "arbitrary or capricious" test prohibits
decisionmaking processes that are starkly irrational, such as
reliance on astrology. At a maximum, it imposes a far more
rigorous requirement of explanation. Whenever an agency has
legal discretion, the "arbitrary or capricious" test requires the
agency to exercise that discretion rationally. Where such discretion involves an issue of policy significance, well-settled
principles of administrative review typically impose a substantial duty of explanation on the agency. In the words of the
court that coined the phrase "hard look," an agency must "articulate with reasonable clarity its reasons for decision, and
identify the significance of the crucial facts."22
An example will illustrate how this modern, process-oriented

might be so essential to a proceeding that an agency's failure to provide
that procedure voluntarily would be "arbitrary," "capricious" or "an abuse
of discretion." Such occasions would be extremely rare. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435
U.S. 519, 543 (1978) (asserting that agencies are free to fashion their
own procedures "[a]bsent . . . extremely compelling circumstances").
20. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 463
U.S. 29, 42-43 (1983) (describing the role of rationality in reviewing an
agency's decisionmaking process).
21. For a list of sources critically examining the evidentiary and theoretical basis of astrological claims, see Gary Lawson, AIDS, Astrology,
and Arline: Towards a Causal Interpretation of Section 504, 17 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 237, 266 n.130 (1989).
22. Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C.
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971). See also Motor Vehicle Mfrs.
Ass'n, 463 U.S. at 43 ("[Tlhe agency must examine the relevant data and
articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action including a 'rational
connection between the facts found and the choice made.'" (quoting
Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1963))).
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review operates. Consider the issue in Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute,2 shorn
of its obvious constitutional overtones.24 The relevant statute
requires the Secretary of Labor to promulgate standards for
workplace exposure to toxic substances
which most adequately assure[], to the extent feasible, on the
basis of the best available evidence, that no employee will
suffer material impairment of health or functional capacity
even if such employee has regular exposure to the hazard
dealt25 with by such standards for the period of his working
life.

Assume that nothing in the statute requires that a toxic substance pose a significant risk to the health of employees before
the agency can lawfully set standards for that substance" and
that no issue of the feasibility of any agency standard is presented.27 Assume further that the agency has overwhelming
factual evidence that very high doses of a fictional toxic substance--call it zenbene-are associated with blood disorders.
The agency also has weaker, but nonetheless substantial, evidence that high doses of zenbene are associated with leukemia.
The agency, however, has no reliable evidence concerning the
health effects of zenbene at the low levels of exposure that are
typical in workplaces. Thus, many different conclusions about
the health effects of low-level zenbene exposure are equally
consistent with the available factual data. The agency must
nonetheless choose a standard to impose on low-level zenbene

23. 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
24. As we shall see, the constitutional problems cannot be entirely
avoided. See infra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
25. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1994).
26. This stipulation solves the problem that worried the plurality in
Industrial Union. See 448 U.S. at 639-41 (concluding in a plurality opinion that the OSH Act authorizes regulation only of "significant risks of
harm").
27. This stipulation removes the problem that prompted then-Justice
Rehnquist to write separately in Industrial Union and in the subsequent
American Textile case. See id. at 671 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (concluding that § 655(b)(5)'s feasibility requirement renders the statute unconstitutionally vague); American Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S.
490, 543 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (same).
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exposure.
It is possible that health risks at high levels of zenbene exposure signal health risks at low levels of exposure, so that the
dose-response curve for zenbene will always show negative
health effects at positive exposure levels. It is also possible,
however, that below a certain threshold zenbene exposure is
harmless, so that no inference about low-level exposure can be
drawn from evidence concerning high-level exposure. It is even
possible that low-level exposure to zenbene is affirmatively
beneficial. Numerous substances are harmful at high levels of
exposure but beneficial at lower levels: Vitamin A is certainly
one such substance, and radiation is probably another.' If, as
we have assumed, the agency does not have any theoretical or
factual grounds on which to base a conclusion about the shape
of zenbene's dose-response curve at low exposure levels, then
no scientific method can determine which standard will "most
adequately assure[] ... , on the basis of the best available
evidence, that no employee will suffer material impairment of
health or functional capacity even if such employee has regular
exposure to the hazard dealt with by such standards for the
period of his working life."29 Nor can a standard be chosen on
the basis of some theory of risk aversion. The question is not
whether employees should receive the maximal possible protection, as the statute already mandates such a goal, but rather
which standard will provide such maximal protection. A rigorous standard that reduces zenbene exposure to zero or nearzero fails to protect employee health best if zenbene behaves
like Vitamin A or radiation. In that instance, the best standard
may well be one that requires workplaces to ensure some lowlevel exposure to zenbene.
The agency, in short, has no scientific way to demonstrate
that any single outcome is the only, or even the best, outcome
under the terms of the statute. The agency must therefore
choose its standard based on considerations external to the
evidence and the statute, such as administrative concerns or
(assuming that the statute permits such considerations) cost-

28. The phenomenon by which low-level doses of radiation promote
health is known as hormesis.
29. As required by 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1994).
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benefit analysis.
A court reviewing the agency's zenbene standard faces the
same problems as did the agency. The court by hypothesis has
no better ground for selecting an appropriate dose-response
curve than does the agency. An outcome test in this context is
therefore of little value.3" If we assume that the agency provides all procedures required by law, the agency has also satisfied all applicable procedural tests. Nonetheless, the agency
must somehow choose from among the range of available standards, on the basis of something like the prudential concerns
suggested above, and its choice must not be "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with law."3 '
A reviewing court in this situation has essentially four options. First, it could say that, because one cannot evaluate the
agency's choice of a standard by reference either to objective
facts or the organic statute, the choice of a standard is essentially a legislative act, and the statute is therefore an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. This is the correct
answer as a matter of first principles,3 2 but it is not available

30. Conceivably, one could say that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by
statute, the proponent of a rule or order has the burden of proof," 5
U.S.C. § 556(d) (1994), and that the agency cannot lawfully promulgate a
standard because it cannot affirmatively justify any standard in light of
the available evidence. This makes no sense, however, in a context in
which the organic statute requires the agency to choose some standard.
31. See supra text accompanying notes 17-20.
32. No precise formula can determine whether a statute grants an
agency so much policymaking discretion that the statute amounts to an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. See Gary Lawson, The
Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1239
(1994) [hereinafter Lawson, The Rise and Rise] (suggesting, in all seriousness, that the Constitution's nondelegation principle provides that "Congress must make whatever policy decisions are sufficiently important to
the statutory scheme at issue so that Congress must make them"); cf
MARTIN H. REDISH, THE CONSTITUTION AS POLITICAL STRUCTURE 136
(1995) (valid statutes must evince "some meaningful level of normative
political commitment by the enacting legislators, thus enabling the electorate to judge its representatives."). See generally Gary Lawson, Who
Legislates?, 1995 PUB. INT. L. REV. 147 (discussing in more detail the
nature, source and application of the Federal Constitution's nondelegation
principle). Determining the assumptions to be made about the shape of
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to a court, especially a lower court, as a matter of current doctrine.33 In the modern administrative state, agencies routinely
make important policy decisions that cannot be reduced to
traditional questions of fact or law.34
Second, the reviewing court could provide only cursory review to an agency's legislative-like policy judgments, such as
the choice of a zenbene standard in the face of genuine factual
uncertainty and statutory silence. It could choose, in other
words, to uphold any agency decision that is not completely
ridiculous on its face. In terms of process review, the court
would forbid the agency to base its decision on astrology or
literally to pull a standard out of a hat, but beyond this requirement of minimum rationality, the courts would not intervene. When enacted in 1946, the Administrative Procedure Act
("APA") probably contemplated this highly deferential form of
review for many agency decisions. The APA specifies a number
of outcome tests 35 and (in conjunction with organic statutes)
procedural tests, 6 but the only real constraint imposed by the
APA on the agency's decisionmaking process is that the process
not be "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law."37 This very strong statutory
language, when untainted by modern understandings, suggests
an extraordinary level of deference to agencies. This highly
deferential approach, however, does not fit well with the modern conception of the judicial role in administrative review.
However correct as an original matter, such an approach is no
more thinkable today than is a revival of the nondelegation

dose-response curves in the face of scientific uncertainty, when the decision can have enormous consequences in terms of lives and dollars, is
not close to the line: it is a decision that Congress must make.
33. See Lawson, The Rise and Rise, supra note 32, at 1240 (noting

that the Supreme Court has not invalidated a statute on non-delegation
grounds since 1935).
34. For an illuminating exploration of the relationship between the
delegation phenomenon and statutory interpretation problems in the modern administrative state, see Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation
and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV.

452 (1989).
35. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (1994).
36. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 553-57 (1994).
37. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1994).
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doctrine."
Third, courts could simply determine the appropriate policy
choices themselves. This option, while possible, is also inconsistent with commonly held understandings about the judicial
role in administrative review and is unlikely to be embraced
openly.39 Modern understandings require a method of review
that allows for an extensive judicial check on agency behavior
but that does not permit the court simply to replace the
agency's policy judgment with its own.
The fourth option, which modern courts have embraced with
vigor, is "hard look" review, under which the court ensures
that the agency has taken a "hard look" at-has thought carefully about-the relevant problem." The best statement of
what such review requires when the agency has decided a
question on which the facts and the law are silent is still found
in the D.C. Circuit's 1974 opinion in Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson:41
What we are entitled to at all events is a careful identification by the Secretary, when his proposed standards are challenged, of the reasons why he chooses to follow one course
rather than another. Where that choice purports to be based
on the existence of certain determinable facts, the Secretary
must, in form as well as substance, find those facts from
evidence in the record. By the same token, when the Secretary is obliged to make policy judgments where no factual
certainties exist or where facts alone do not provide the answer, he should so state and go on to identify the considerations he found persuasive.42
The agency must demonstrate awareness and candor. It must
indicate that it knows that it is dealing with factual and statutory uncertainty and that an answer is therefore not dictated
by any evidentiary or interpretative considerations. It must
then identify the nonfactual and nonstatutory considerations
38. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
39. See, e.g., Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n of the United States, 463 U.S.

at 43 (noting that "a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of
the agency").
40. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
41. 499 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
42. Id. at 475-76.
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upon which it chooses to rely and the reasons why it selected
those considerations rather than others. The agency should
prevail, on this model, so long as those considerations and the
reasons that led to them bear some plausible relation to the
agency's mission.4"
Accordingly, to satisfy the "hard look" requirement, the
agency charged with setting zenbene standards in the above
example would have to explain its decisionmaking process in
something like the following terms:
The governing statute tells us to set the zenbene standard
that best promotes worker safety. We cannot identify such a
standard without knowing the shape of the dose-response
curve for zenbene at low levels of exposure. We have no data
concerning such exposure and no theoretical reason for choosing any one of the infinite shapes that a dose-response curve
might take. Accordingly, a wide range of standards, corresponding to the many possible dose-response curves that fit
the available data, are supportable under the statute and
facts before us. Nonetheless, we are compelled by statute to
choose a standard. We cannot base that choice directly on
evidence or statutory command and must therefore rely on
some combination of prudential or administrative concerns.
These are not the considerations upon which we would rely
in an ideal world, but this is not an ideal world. We considered the problem exhaustively using whatever tools were at
hand and now offer the prudential and administrative concerns that we ultimately find decisive.
II. CHEVRON REVIEW VERSUS PROCESS REVIEW
The Chevron test is an outcome test. Chevron review judges
the relationship between an agency's interpretation of a statute and the court's understanding of the statute's meaning.
The agency interpretation must stand if it is a reasonable fit

43. Of course, nothing guarantees that courts applying this model of
review will stay within its confines. Courts can defer too little, by substituting their policy judgment for the agency's, or too much, by rubberstamping agency decisions without serious analysis. Any standard can be
misapplied intentionally or unintentionally, however, and nothing suggests
that the "hard look" doctrine is much worse than other standards in this
regard.
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with the statute, even if it is not, in the court's judgment, an
ideal fit." Chevron review is thus analogous to the substantial evidence test. The agency's legal conclusion under Chevron
is analogous to the agency's factual conclusion under the substantial evidence test, and the court's understanding of the
statute's meaning in a Chevron case is analogous to the record
evidence in a substantial evidence case. With both Chevron
and the substantial evidence test, the question is whether the
agency's decision satisfies some requisite degree of fit with a
specified body of material.45 Under Chevron, as is true under
the substantial evidence test, the reviewing court need not
know how or why the agency chose the particular interpretation under review. Chevron is concerned solely with whether
that interpretation, however reached, is a reasonable interpretation of the statute.
Of course, an agency can satisfy the Chevron test and still
lose the case. If, for example, the agency has failed to provide a
legally required hearing, its decision will fail a procedural test
even though it has satisfied the relevant outcome test. Further,
if the agency reaches its interpretation through a
decisionmaking process that is "arbitrary" or "capricious," the
agency decision cannot stand even if the interpretation itself is
substantively reasonable under Chevron.
This latter point is simple, indeed obvious, but often overlooked: even when the agency has chosen an interpretation of a
statute that is reasonable under Chevron, firmly settled principles of administrative review independently require a careful
examination of the process or method by which the agency
formulated its reasonable interpretation.48 If an agency construes a statute by putting the possible interpretations into a
hat and pulling one out at random, the agency decision cannot
stand, even if the agency's conclusion happens to be substantively reasonable. The parties are entitled to have the agency reach

44. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844.
45. The degree of fit required by Chevron may not mirror the degree
of fit required by the substantial evidence test. The precise degree to
which agency interpretations must fit the statute under Chevron is not
important at this point, though it will become important later in the
analysis. See infra text accompanying notes 51-54.
46. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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a substantively reasonable conclusion through a rational,
nonarbitrary method of reasoning. This is exactly the reasoned
decisionmaking requirement that Professor Seidenfeld hopes to
graft onto Chevron review. Such grafting is unnecessary, however, because the requirement is already part of the law-not
through Chevron as such, but through the requirement that
agency decisions not be arbitrary or capricious.
A moment's reflection will indicate how arbitrary or capricious review supplements Chevron review. Chevron review does
not require the agency to select the best possible interpretation
of a statute, but only an interpretation that is within a zone of
reasonableness. Consequently, many interpretations of a single
statute often will pass the Chevron test. The agency can choose
any of those permissible interpretations and survive Chevron
review. The agency's selection of one of the permissible interpretations, however, does not end the judicial review process.
The parties are still entitled to ask the agency why it chose
that interpretation rather than one of the other permissible
interpretations. The agency is not entitled to choose a substantively permissible interpretation for an impermissible-that is,
arbitrary or capricious-reason. Under the general requirement that agencies justify their exercises of discretion,
the agency must explain how it made its choice from among
permissible alternatives. The agency's interpretation must
actually be reasonable to survive Chevron's outcome test and
must have been chosen by reasonable means to satisfy the
arbitrary or capricious standard's process test.
The crucial question is what kind of explanation the agency
must provide when it chooses from among permissible interpretations of a statute. The precise scope of the explanation
requirement under the arbitrary or capricious test varies with
the context. The "hard look" requirement of extensive explanation is generally associated with decisions involving significant
questions of policy. Many other areas involving agency discretion do not require "hard look" review. For example, the decision whether to reopen a matter in the face of new evidence or
changed circumstances47 or the decision whether to grant a

47. See ICC v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 482 U.S. 270, 278
(1987) (stating that courts should overturn an agency's refusal to reopen
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petition to initiate a rulemaking 8 call for only minimal judicial scrutiny under current law. Where along this spectrum
does the choice of an interpretation from among a range of
permissible interpretations fall, and what is the character of
the explanation that the agency must provide?
The answers depend upon the nature of the statute that the
agency is interpreting. If all statutes lent themselves to traditional statutory analysis, meaning that a sufficiently careful
study of the statute's text, structure, purposes and (if one believes in such things) legislative history would always yield a
determinate outcome, then the only acceptable reason for an
agency to choose an interpretation would be that the agency
sincerely believed that interpretation to be the best among the
available alternatives.49 It would be starkly irrational for an
agency to say, "We believe that Congress has instructed us to
do X, but we think Y is better policy. We can assert that Y is
at least a plausible interpretation of the statute, and therefore
adopt Y even though we do not believe it is the correct one." If
the agency genuinely concludes that one statutory interpretation is correct, it must choose that interpretation. Under Chevron, a court can affirm the agency decision even if the court
believes that the interpretation is not the best available alternative. The reasons advanced by the agency for that interpretation, however, must pertain to the correctness of the interpretation.

a proceeding only upon a showing of the "clearest abuse of discretion").
48. See WWHT, Inc. v. FCC, 656 F.2d 807, 809 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
('[T]he decision to institute rulemaking is one that is largely committed
to the discretion of the agency, and . . . the scope of review of such a

determination must, of necessity, be very narrow.").
49. Conceivably, one' could require an agency's interpretation to meet
some higher threshold of proof. For example, one could require an agency
to believe that its interpretation is not merely the best alternative, but
that it is more likely than not to be correct, or even correct beyond a
reasonable doubt. A best-available-alternative test and a preponderance-ofthe-evidence test can lead to different outcomes whenever a statute affords more than two possible interpretations. The standard of proof required for claims about legal meaning, however, leads very quickly to a
large set of problems discussed at length elsewhere. See Lawson, supra
note 2; Gary Lawson, Proving Ownership, 11 SOC. PHIL. & POLY 139
(1994).
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The substantial evidence test for agency factual conclusions
illustrates this point."° Under that test, courts must affirm
agency decisions based upon factual conclusions so long as
those conclusions are plausible, even if the court believes that
the agency has it wrong. This test, however, does not entitle
the agency to choose a wrong answer knowingly, simply because that answer is plausible. The substantial evidence test
instructs reviewing courts to review agency outcomes generously; it does not license agencies to choose wrong answers knowingly if right ones are attainable using traditional tools of
factfinding. In, for example, an unfair labor practice case in
which the employer's anti-union animus is a critical issue, an
agency could not reason as follows:
Given the facts, we think that the employer probably did not
act with anti-union animus. A contrary conclusion, though
not the best answer, would not be ridiculous and could probably pass the substantial evidence test. We choose to find that
the employer acted with anti-union animus. We so conclude
not because of anything in the evidence before us, which in
fact persuades us of the contrary conclusion, but because we
believe that imposing liability on the employer will promote
some other policy which we regard as desirable.
This explanation would fail the arbitrary or capricious test
even though, by hypothesis, the agency's factual conclusion
would pass the substantial evidence test. The agency must give
a reasoned explanation for its factual conclusion, and the reasons must pertain to the record evidence.
Similarly, agencies must give reasoned explanations for their
legal conclusions, and, where possible, those reasons must
pertain to the meaning of the statute. The agency must believe
that its interpretation is correct, even if the court will not
require that the interpretation in fact be correct. Chevron instructs reviewing courts to review agency legal conclusions
generously; it does not license agencies to choose wrong conclusions knowingly if right ones are attainable.
The analysis thus far assumes that agencies and courts
construe statutes using traditional methods of statutory inter-

50. See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text (discussing the substantial evidence test).
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pretation. It is well acknowledged, however, that much of what
passes under the name of "statutory interpretation" in the
modern administrative state is really naked policymaking. 1
Statutes are often too vague to be "interpreted" in any meaningful sense, and the traditional tools of interpretation will not
always yield an answer. No amount of statutory interpretation,
however skillful or intensive, will instruct the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration ("OSHA") how to set standards for toxic substances in the workplace in the face of scientific uncertainty. In the old days, statutes that did not lend
themselves to interpretation in the traditional sense would be
prime candidates for invalidation as unconstitutional delegations of legislative authority.52 In the modern world, however,
invalidating such statutes is generally not a doctrinally-available option for courts.53 Accordingly, the agency must resolve
problems arising under the statute, even if the agency's best
good-faith effort at traditional statutory interpretation leaves it
without guidance. In these contexts, the agency actually makes
policy choices when it "interprets" the statute. An agency faced
with such statutory silence is in much the same position as a
hypothetical OSHA faced with factual silence regarding the
low-level dose-response curve for zenbene.54 If the agency has
a statutory mandate to establish zenbene standards that best
promote worker safety but no factual data on which to base
dose-response curves, it must set workplace exposure standards for toxic substances on the basis of nonfactual, nonscientific policy concerns. When statutes are silent and agencies are
nonetheless enjoined to act, agencies must base decisions on
policy concerns that are not directly dictated by the statute.
At this point, the 'hard look" doctrine makes its appearance.

51. See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Chevron and Its Aftermath: Judicial Review of Agency Interpretations of Statutory Provisions, 41 VAND. L.
REV. 301, 304 (1988) (asserting that statutory interpretation often requires an agency to resolve policy rather than legal issues).
52. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
53. See Lawson, The Rise and the Rise, supra note 32, at 1240 (noting

that the Supreme Court has not invalidated a statute on nondelegation
grounds since 1935).
54. See supra text accompanying notes 23-31 (dealing with zenbene
hypothetical).
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Modern doctrine requires agencies to explain their significant
policy choices. The selection of one statutory interpretation
over other possible alternative interpretations can easily qualify as a significant policy choice. In that instance, the agency
must demonstrate to the parties and the reviewing court that
the agency has at least carefully considered the interpretative
problem, even if such consideration did not lead unambiguously to a single outcome. When the agency chooses a particular
reading of the statute from among a range of possibilities, the
agency is obliged to explain the decisionmaking process that
underlies its choice.
Accordingly, settled modem doctrine requires the following
from a court reviewing an agency interpretation of a statute
that it administers:
Ensure that the agency provided all procedures required by
law. Then ask, pursuant to Chevron, if the agency's outcome
is a reasonable "fit" with the statute. Do not require the
agency's interpretation of the statute to be correct (as determined by whatever theory of statutory interpretation the
court employs), but rather require that the conclusion be one
that a reasonable person could reach. If the agency's interpretation satisfies this deferential outcome test, then ask whether the process by which the agency reached that conclusion
was "arbitrary" or "capricious." A nonarbitrary, noncapricious
agency process must at least attempt to determine the correct
interpretation of the statute. Require the agency to explain
how it tried to reach a conclusion using traditional tools of
statutory interpretation. Generously defer to the agency's
identification and application of the relevant interpretative
tools, but ensure that the agency sincerely attempted to use
actual interpretative tools. If, but only if, the agency genuinely and reasonably concludes that traditional tools of statutory interpretation are ineffective in this case, allow the
agency to employ considerations of policy in resolving the
matter. Review of those considerations should follow the
traditional "hard look" approach: ensure that the agency
identifies and articulates the factors that it considers and the
assumptions that it makes; determine (with an appropriately
deferential attitude) if those factors and assumptions are
substantively rational; and ensure that the agency applied its
articulated considerations reasonably, logically and consistently.
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III. THE EMERGING UNDERSTANDING OF CHEVRON
Professor Seidenfeld's article is only one sign of an emerging
recognition within the administrative law community of the
need to consider carefully the relationship between the Chevron test and the arbitrary or capricious standard of review.
Judge Laurence Silberman of the D.C. Circuit, for example,
has expressed important thoughts on this question in a law
review article as well as several opinions, at least one of which
provides powerful precedential support for Professor
Seidenfeld's proposal. Judge Silberman's discussion reflects his
characteristic insight, but also illustrates the need for judges,
lawyers and scholars carefully to distinguish outcome review
from process review.
In the 1990 law review article, Judge Silberman suggested
that step two of Chevron
is not all that different analytically from the APA's arbitrary
and capricious review. In either the second step of Chevron or
in arbitrary and capricious review, the court often asks itself
whether the agency considered and weighed the factors Congress wished the agency to bring to bear on its decision. If
the agency did so, that the court would have struck the balance somewhat differently cannot be grounds to overturn the
agency's action."
A recent opinion authored by Judge Silberman translates this
approach into practice. The opinion merits close examination
for at least two reasons. First, it serves as an excellent, and
rare, 56 case study of the interface between Chevron and arbitrary or capricious review; and second, it demonstrates that at
least in some circumstances a requirement that agencies explain the basis for their legal judgments is the law in fact as

55. Laurence H. Silberman, Chevron-The Intersection of Law and

Policy, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 821, 827-28 (1990).
56. Very few cases provide any serious discussion of step two of Chevron, much less a careful discussion of the relationship between step two
and the arbitrary or capricious test. Indeed, the only other recent case
that has come to my attention that pays substantial attention to the step
two analysis was also written by Judge Silberman. See Whitecliff, Inc. v.
Shalala, 20 F.3d 488 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
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well as in theory.
In National Ass'n of Regulatory Utility Commissioners v. ICC
("NARUC"), 5 7 the D.C. Circuit ordered the Interstate Commerce Commission to reconsider its proposed registration
scheme for interstate motor carriers." Prior to 1993, states
that charged registration fees to interstate motor carriers had
to participate in a so-called "bingo card" program.5 9 For each
vehicle that engaged in interstate traffic, the carrier had to
obtain a specific card that listed all of the states participating
in the registration program.6" After the carrier paid the registering state the appropriate registration fee for a specific vehicle, that state would issue a stamp to the carrier.6 ' The stamp
was placed on the vehicle's card in the spot corresponding to
that state. 62 To check registration of a vehicle operating within the state, a participating state simply examined the
vehicle's "bingo card" for a proper stamp.6 3
In 1991, Congress ordered the Commission to replace the
vehicle-specific "bingo-card" system with a scheme that allowed
motor carriers to pay a single fleet-wide fee to one registering
state, which would then share the fee with other participating
states. 4 States that receive registration fees must "issue a
receipt... reflecting that the carrier.., has paid fee amounts
in accordance with the fee system established," 5 and each
registering carrier must keep copies of the receipt "in each of
the carrier's commercial motor vehicles." 66
One important question arising under the new statutory
scheme concerned whether the states or the carriers would

57.
joined
58.
59.

60.
61.
62.
63.

41
by
Id.
Id.

F.3d 721 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Judge Silberman's opinion was
Judges Buckley and Rogers.
at 723.
at 724.

Id.
1&
Id.
Id.

64. See Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act, Pub. L. No.
102-240, § 4005, 105 Stat. 1914, 2146-48 (1991) (codified at 49 U.S.C. §

11506 (1994)).
65. 49 U.S.C. § 11506(c)(2)(B)(i) (1994).
66. Id. at § 11506(c)(2)(B)(ii).
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make copies of the registration receipts. 7 The carriers advocated a system in which they, rather than the registering
states ("base states"), would make enough copies of the one
official receipt to cover the fleets for which they paid fees."8
The carriers maintained that such a system would reduce their
administrative burdens and minimize delays and paperwork
resulting from lost or destroyed receipt copies." The states
and insurance companies urged the Commission to require the
base states, rather than the carriers, to issue to each carrier
official copies of the registration receipt, equal to the number
of vehicles for which that carrier paid a registration fee. ° The
states argued that allowing the carriers to copy receipts invited
fraud, as only costly audits would ensure that carriers copied
only enough receipts to cover vehicles for which fees were
paid.7 ' If a vehicle was checked at a roadside point, possession
of a carrier-made copy of the registration receipt would prove
only that the carrier had registered at least one vehicle; no
immediately available method would determine whether the
carrier had actually paid a registration fee for each vehicle it
was currently operating.72
A sharply divided Commission accepted the carriers' position.73 The Commission first noted that "[w]hile the statute
does not specify who is responsible for making copies of the
receipt to be kept in each commercial motor vehicle,"7" the
statute's use of the singular term "a receipt.., suggests that
the only paper document a State is permitted to issue is a
single receipt."75 The Commission also found support for its
decision in the statute's legislative history. The Commission
noted that

67. National Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs, 41 F.3d at 725.
68. Id. at 728.
69. See id. at 727 (discussing ICC's belief that its task was to ease
the carriers' administrative burdens in obtaining copies).
70. Id. at 724.
71. Id. at 728.
72. Id. at 726.
73. See Single-State Insurance Registration, No. MC-100 (SUB-NO. 6),
1993 WL 164867, at *1 (I.C.C. May 10, 1993). The Commission vote on
this question was 3-2, with the Chairman and Vice-Chairman dissenting.
74. Id. at *5.
75. Id.
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the legislative history explains that the new system is to be
instituted by the Commission "in such a manner as to eliminate as much of the paperwork and other compliance burdens
as possible." A system in which the base State-issued receipt
can be copied and distributed by a carrier to its trucks is the
least burdensome way of disseminating the copy of the receipt that must be carried in each vehicle."8
Although having state-issued receipts for each registered vehicle might enhance the states' ability to enforce their registration systems through roadside vehicle inspections, the Commission maintained that "such an approach would seem to go
beyond Congress' intention and venture into the realm of assisting State enforcement efforts that Congress did not specifically address."7 7 States could protect their registration fee revenues from carrier fraud by using information required under
other regulatory schemes" or by using their power "individually or collectively ... [to] audit carrier records ...to enforce
compliance with the law."7 9 Finally, the Commission noted
that permitting carriers to copy the receipt "would decrease
burdens for carriers by eliminating delays when they add or
replace vehicles and it would permit carriers more easily to
replace lost or destroyed documents." °
The states petitioned for review of the Commission's decision
on the ground that permitting carriers to copy receipts is "arbitrary and capricious because it is inconsistent with one of the
evident purposes of the ... [statute]-to preserve state revenues."81 The states argued that the statute's requirement that
each vehicle carry a copy of the carrier's registration receipt
demonstrated that Congress contemplated some level of roadside enforcement of the fee requirement. 2 Further, they argued, the legislative history evinced a concern not just "to
benefit the interstate carriers by eliminating unnecessary

76. Id. (quoting H.R. CONF. REP. No. 102-404, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.
440 (1991)).

77. Id.
78. Id.

79. Id. at *23 n.5.
80. Id. at *6.

81. National Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs, 41 F.3d at 726.
82. Id. (interpreting 49 U.S.C. § 11506(c)(2)(B)(ii) (1994)).
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compliance burdens,"83 but also "to preserve revenues for the
states which [sic] had participated in the bingo program." 4 If
the carriers can simply make an unlimited number of copies of
a single receipt, "states lose their capacity to police the number
of vehicles registered by a carrier for use within their territory.°))8

The Commission responded that the statute was silent on
whether the carriers or the states would make copies of the
registration receipt and that the Commission's rule was a permissible interpretation of the statute under Chevron."' Thus,
the petitioning states insisted that the issue was whether the
Commission's decision satisfied the "arbitrary or capricious"
test, while the Commission sought to frame the issue in terms
of Chevron.
Judge Silberman's opinion saw no fundamental difference
between the two characterizations of the relevant issue. His
discussion is the most sophisticated (even if not entirely correct) treatment yet seen of the relationship between Chevron
and the arbitrary or capricious test:
Perhaps because neither the wording of the statute nor the
legislative history explicitly addresses the question of the
assignment of copying responsibility, petitioners frame their
arguments in terms of an arbitrary and capricious challenge
rather than a claim of agency misinterpretation of the statute. Yet petitioners emphasize that the "Commission's analysis of congressional intent makes no sense" - because it
assumes that "Congress did not intend, or was indifferent,
that the [single-state system] be enforced." Implicitly then, if
not directly, petitioners are arguing as well that the Commission has impermissibly interpreted the statute (Chevron Step
II). This is not surprising; the inquiry at the second step of
Chevron overlaps analytically with a court's task under the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) in determining whether
agency action is arbitrary and capricious (unreasonable). See,
e.g., General Am. Transp. Corp. v. ICC, 872 F.2d 1048, 1053
(D.C. Cir. 1989) ("[T]he questions posed-has the Commission

83. H.R. REP. No. 102-404, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 437 (1991).
84. Id.
85. National Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs, 41 F.3d at 726.
86. Id.
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adopted an impermissible construction of the Act and is
its . . . policy arbitrary and capricious-are quite similar.
Both questions require us to determine whether the Commission, in effecting a reconciliation of competing statutory aims,
has rationally considered the factors deemed relevant by the
Act."). Whether an agency action is to be judged as reasonable, in accordance with the APA's general arbitrary and
capricious standard, or whether it is to be examined as a
permissible interpretation of the statute vel non depends, at
least theoretically, on the scope of the specific congressional
delegation implicated .... [T]he more an agency purports to
rely on Congress' policy choice-as set forth in specific legislation-than on the agency's generally conferred discretion,
the more the question before the court is logically treated as
an issue of statutory interpretation, to be judged by Chevron
standards.87
On the merits, the court found it "hard to take the
Commission's position seriously."'8 According to the court, the
statute presented the agency with the familiar task of balancing conflicting policy objectives.8 9 In this case, the agency
faced the task of "reducing carrier burdens while preserving
state registration revenues (the latter maintained through
roadside enforcement). 0 The court found two critical errors
in the Commission's handling of that balancing problem. First,
"the agency purported to find in the statute a legal constraint
on that balancing process that is simply not there."91 Second,
although the court acknowledged that the agency may "give
somewhat greater weight to the goal of easing the carriers'
administrative burdens than to the competing statutory objective," 2 relegating the states to enforcement by audit "strikes

87. Id. at 726-27 (citations omitted).
88. Id. at 728.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. According to the court, the statute's requirement that all vehicles carry registration receipt copies could only be designed to promote
roadside enforcement by state agencies. Id. Therefore, the court concluded, it was "wholly artificial for the Commission to assert that for it to
'assist' state roadside enforcement would contravene congressional intent."

Id.
92. Id.
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us as not so much a balance of conflicting policy goals as the
acceptance of one without any real consideration of the other."' s The agency, said the court, "must explain how such an
alternative could possibly substitute, under any plausible
cost/benefit analysis, for the traditional-and congressionally
approved-method of roadside enforcement." 4 Further, "the
Commission failed

. . .

to explain the extent to which a carrier

actually would be 'burdened' in the event a copy was lost or
stolen and replacement could only be had from the registration
state."5 In sum, "[t]he Commission has ...

acted unreason-

ably, whether one considers the case as one involving a question of Chevron Step II statutory interpretation or a garden
variety arbitrary and capricious review or, as we do, a case
that overlaps both administrative law concepts."9"
The court's analysis does not adequately distinguish between
outcome review and process review. This primarily stems from
the failure of the courts that have formulated the Chevron
doctrine, the Supreme Court in particular, to clarify the meaning of "reasonable" or "permissible" at step two of the Chevron
test. If Chevron is viewed, as it should be, as a pure outcome
test, then an interpretation is "reasonable" if it conforms, with
some non-minimal degree of fit, to an external standard of
correct statutory interpretation. Reasonableness in that context
has nothing at all to do with the agency's explanation for or
defense of its interpretation; rather, review of the agency's
reasoning process is left to the arbitrary or capricious test. On
the other hand, if one takes the Chevron step two requirement
of reasonableness to be a general requirement that subsumes
both outcomes and processes, then it does indeed become very
difficult to distinguish Chevron step two review from arbitrary
or capricious review. A general requirement of reasonableness
is precisely what the modern interpretation of the arbitrary or
capricious test requires of every agency decision to which that
test applies.97

93. Id.

94.
95.
96.
97.

Id.
Id.
Id.
A number of decisions slide, without discussion or apparent aware-

ness, from outcome-based to process-based notions of what is "reasonable"
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The distinction between an outcome test of reasonableness
and a process test of reasonableness can be clarified by examining more closely the two errors in the agency decision found
by the NARUC court. The first error concerned the agency's
statement that formulating its policy with any regard at all for
facilitating state enforcement efforts would contravene the
statute. 98 This error can be considered in two ways. One is in
terms of outcomes. One could say that even though the statute
says nothing specifically about who is to copy receipts, the
statute's context, history, legislative history and purposes all
demonstrate that it requires some balancing of carrier and
state enforcement interests. A wide range of balances, including balances that seem strongly to favor carrier interests over
state interests, fall within Chevron's notion of reasonable statutory interpretations; however, an interpretation that views
the statute as precluding any consideration of state enforcement efforts falls outside the zone of reasonableness. Thus,
applying conventional principles of statutory interpretation,
one could argue that the agency has straightforwardly read
into the statute a command that plainly is not present.
This error, however, is better seen as one of process that
implicates the arbitrary or capricious test rather than one of
outcome that implicates Chevron. The ultimate decision under
review is the agency's decision to permit carriers to copy receipts. The primary outcome question is whether that specific
decision can plausibly be justified under the statute. The
agency's subsidiary construction of the statute to preclude
consideration of state enforcement interests in the
decisionmaking process is a reason for reaching the ultimate
interpretation under review. If the agency had never intimated
that the statute forbade consideration of state enforcement
interests, a court would still have to decide whether the
agency's ultimate decision to permit carriers to copy registration receipts reflects a reasonable interpretation of the relevant
statute. Either the statute objectively permits such an interpretation or it does not. If it does permit such an interpretaor "permissible" under step two of Chevron. See, e.g., Continental Air
Lines v. DOT, 843 F.2d 1444, 1452 (D.C. Cir. 1988); AFL-CIO v. Brock,
835 F.2d 912, 917 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
98. National Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs, 41 F.3d at 728.
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tion, a court could then ask whether the agency reached that
permissible outcome through an impermissible reasoning process.99 If the agency reached its conclusion because it thought
that the statute forbade consideration of state enforcement
interests, 00 the court would have been correct to remand to
the agency for further consideration, as the statute clearly contained no such prohibition.
The second error found by the court concerned the balancing
of carrier and state enforcement interests reflected in the carriers-may-copy rule.'0 ' Once again, one can view this issue in
two ways. First, one can consider whether the particular balance struck by the agency is substantively reasonable. For this
purpose, whether one views the question from the perspective
of Chevron step two or the arbitrary or capricious test is important in a number of respects.
For one thing, substantive reasonableness under Chevron
step two should be judged solely by reference to the organic
statute under consideration, while substantive reasonableness
under the arbitrary or capricious test can be judged by anything that is generally relevant to reasoned decisionmaking. Of
course, with a broad enough theory of statutory interpretation,
such as one that holds that statutes should always be construed to promote good public policy, any part of a system of
reasoned decisionmaking becomes, by definition, part of the
statutory interpretation process. If one has a more limited view
of what counts as relevant for statutory interpretation, however, such as text, structure, purpose and legislative history, reasonableness under Chevron step two should involve a much

99. See supra text accompanying notes 20-22.
100. It is not certain that the agency made such a claim. The court

focused on one line in the agency opinion that said that adopting a system of state-issued receipts "would seem to go beyond Congress' intention
and venture into the realm of assisting State enforcement efforts that
Congress did not specifically address." National Ass'n of Regulatory Util.
Comm'rs, 41 F.3d at 727 (citing Single-State Insurance Registration, No.
MC-100 (SUB-NO. 6), 1993 WL 164867, at *5 (I.C.C. May 10, 1993)). In
the context of the Commission's whole opinion, which includes explicit
discussion of the impact of its proposals on state enforcement efforts,
hanging dispositive weight on this one inelegant and arguably ambiguous
statement is at least uncharitable.
101. Id. at 728.
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more focused and constrained inquiry than reasonableness
under the arbitrary or capricious test.
On the other hand, the standard of review for agency outcomes under the arbitrary or capricious test may be more deferential than the standard of review under Chevron step two.
The arbitrary or capricious test authorizes courts to hold agencies to general standards of reasonableness in all aspects of
their decisionmaking, including the outcomes they reach."°2 It
runs counter to modern administrative law principles, however, for courts to second-guess agency outcomes directly when
agencies are exercising discretion in policy-laden areas.0 3
This is a major reason for the development in modern times of
"hard look" review: instead of directly overturning agency outcomes, courts require agencies to give detailed explanations for
their decisions and then scrutinize those explanations for completeness, coherence and consistency.04 It would raise serious
eyebrows in the administrative law world for a court openly to
say, in any but the most egregious cases, 'Wethink the agency
incorrectly balanced the various factors involved and thus
reached a wrong outcome." This is not to say that courts do not
in fact second-guess agency outcomes in this fashion; of course,
they do it all the time. Modern doctrine, however, discourages
judges and lawyers from openly talking in terms of judicial
reversal of agency policy outcomes. Instead, they translate
complaints about the substance of agency decisionmaking into
complaints about the agency's procedures or decisionmaking
process. Rather than saying, "the agency reached the wrong
result," lawyers and judges typically say, "the agency failed to
provide an adequate explanation for its results and thereby
failed to demonstrate that it engaged in reasoned
decisionmaking." Accordingly, formal doctrine, if not actual
practice, confines outcome review of policy-oriented decisions
under the arbitrary or capricious test to overturning only truly
outrageous outcomes.
The reasonableness test under step two of Chevron is not
quite so generous. Although no decision or set of decisions has

102. See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
103. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
104. See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
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ever clearly defined a "reasonable" interpretation of a statute,
observers of and participants in the administrative process
have generally assumed that reasonableness review under step
two is roughly comparable, in intensity, to review of factual
conclusions under the substantial evidence test.0° That standard is highly deferential, but it authorizes courts to reject far
more agency outcomes than does a standard that only permits
rejection of truly outrageous outcomes.
In sum, outcome review under Chevron step two, properly
conceived, is simultaneously less deferential and more limited
than outcome review under the arbitrary or capricious test.
Chevron step two considers fewer factors than does the arbitrary or capricious test, but Chevron holds the agency to a
higher standard of care with respect to those factors.
The court in NARUC may have applied an outcome test
when it stated that adopting a system that makes roadside
enforcement of the registration system virtually impossible
"strikes us as not so much a balance of conflicting policy goals
as the acceptance of one without any real consideration of the
other.""'6 In other words, if the statute contemplated no roadside enforcement, why would it require trucks to carry copies
of the receipts at all? Therefore, a scheme that hampers such
enforcement as much as does the carriers-may-copy rule is
simply an unreasonable outcome.
The agency's success on this issue under an outcome test
may well have depended on which outcome test the court applied. The agency's carriers-may-copy outcome may or may not
have survived review under Chevron step two, but it is an easy
winner under the arbitrary or capricious standard's "truly
outrageous outcome" test. Congress ordered abandonment of
the vehicle-specific bingo-card system, the one evident method

105. The issue is far more complicated than this, but a thorough treatment would involve a separate article. One would have to explore, inter
alia, the general nature of standards of proof and the extent to which
Chevron step two calls for a single standard of proof or a range of standards depending on various features of the agency decision under review.
The only point here is that outcome review under Chevron step two,
whatever its true character, is generally more intensive and less deferential than is outcome review under the arbitrary or capricious test.
106. National Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs, 41 F.3d at 728.
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for assuring effective roadside enforcement of state registration
requirements. Any other system would be highly imperfect and
would probably require state audits as the principal enforcement tool. It may be wrong, but it is not outrageous, to conclude that it makes little sense to pay much attention to roadside enforcement under any single-state registration system.
The agency's conclusion clearly survives an arbitrary or capricious outcome test, even if it would fail a more vigorous Chevron step two test.
The NARUC court's criticism of the agency's balancing of
carrier and state enforcement interests, however, likely resulted from process review rather than outcome review. The court
emphasized that the agency seemed not to have given "any
real consideration" to the states' enforcement interests, which
is the language of process review. The court continued in this
vein:
At minimum, the Commission must explain how such an
alternative could possibly substitute, under any plausible
cost/benefit analysis, for the traditional-and congressionally
approved-method of roadside enforcement. As for the
carriers' interests, the Commission failed ...

to explain the

extent to which a carrier actually would be "burdened" in the
event a copy was lost or stolen and
replacement could only be
10 7
had from the registration state.

This insistence on adequate explanations constitutes process
review: the problem is not the agency's outcome as such, but
the agency's failure to demonstrate that the outcome resulted
from a careful consideration of all relevant factors.
Does it matter whether this process review occurs under the
rubric of the arbitrary or capricious test's "hard look" doctrine
or the reasonableness standard of Chevron step two as previously described? Probably not, so long as the process component of Chevron reasonableness is applied in the same way as
the "hard look" doctrine. Nonetheless, it is probably the better
part of valor to keep the distinction clear by limiting Chevron's
reasonableness test to review of outcomes and leaving process
review to the familiar "hard look" standard. Courts and lawyers are then less likely to misunderstand or misapply the
107. Id.
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relevant process test. The "hard look" doctrine, after all, is
familiar to judges and administrative lawyers; the trick is
simply to get them to apply that familiar doctrine to agency
legal conclusions. Chevron is confusing enough without making
the step two reasonableness requirement perform double-duty
as both an outcome test and a process test.
IV. CONCLUSION
Whether one considers the agency's obligation to explain and
justify its legal interpretations as stemming from step two of
Chevron or (as argued here) from the "hard look" component of
the generally-applicable arbitrary or capricious test, current
doctrine clearly imposes such an obligation in theory. The D.C.
Circuit's decision in NARUC may generate such an obligation
in fact as well.

